比特币的治理

Author's source Liu Jiaolian Why do we care about the governance of Bitcoin is important because Bitcoin is the first successful, most liquid and most well-known cryptocurrency. In other words, a sound currency is the foundation pillar of civilization. Bitcoin has regained this powerful social coordination tool. If the governance model of Bitcoin is flawed, it will hinder Bitcoin from giving full play to its potential. If the governance model of Bitcoin is flawed, Bitcoin stakeholders should make efforts to repair its bit. The discussion of currency governance often focuses on who is the final decision maker, and the repeated candidates, including miners' nodes and investors' governance objectives and mechanisms, are often only hinted or even divorced from reality. The view on past governance efficiency is often who won or lost a specific decision rather than whether the decision-making process itself is sufficient. What is the governance of bitcoin? It is a set of rules for transaction and block verification. Individuals use these rules to verify that they are trading and executing. Whether the payment received in the block conforms to their subjective definition of bitcoin, if two or more people adopt the same set of verification rules, they form a subjective social consensus about bitcoin. What is the purpose of bitcoin governance? There are various opinions about the purpose of bitcoin governance. For what results should governance optimize? No trust is the most important feature of bitcoin. No trust is defined as not trusting anything except the open source software you run when using bitcoin. If there is no untrusted attribute, all other positive results will be damaged. It is believed that the maximization of bitcoin value is the optimization goal of governance. It is said that the general rule of bitcoin upgrading is that it can improve the value of bitcoin. The upgrading of bitcoin will be adopted, but it will not be adopted. In the context of bitcoin governance, these two views respectively reflect the classic differences between the deontological criterion and the consequentialist criterion. My preferred deontological criterion is to pay attention to distrust. From ancient coin producers to modern central banks, the result of trusting others to produce money is abuse of trust. Compromising on distrust may help the price of bitcoin find a local maximum, but at the cost of finding a higher global maximum. Besides, there is no evidence that the price of bitcoin is related to the upgrade of bitcoin agreement. Perhaps the basic value of bitcoin will be affected by the upgrade, but the liquidity and volatility of bitcoin are very low, and the price cannot reliably reflect the basic value. We should try to define how the current bitcoin governance program actually works before evaluating whether the current bitcoin governance program meets the established goal of maintaining the untrustworthiness of bitcoin or improving the value of bitcoin. The current bitcoin governance program maintains a set of verification rules, which cover grammar from a high level. It is not easy to modify these rules to the letter. Most of these rules are inherited from Satoshi Nakamoto. Some rules are added or revised to solve vulnerabilities and denial-of-service vulnerabilities. Other rules are modified to achieve innovative new projects, such as adding new opcodes to enable new scripts. Every rule change begins with research, such as isolating witnesses. It is from the study of repairing the transaction's tampering that the transaction's tampering has become a serious problem, because it hinders the deployment of lightning network on Bitcoin, and the cooperation between the industry and independent researchers has finally formed an isolated witness. Critics point out that there is occasionally a disconnect between what researchers want to study, the expectations of users and what is beneficial to the network's characteristics. In addition, computer scientists in academic circles prefer scientific simulation to engineering experiments, which has always been a tension in the scientific research community. When researchers find a solution to a problem, they will share their modification suggestions with other protocol developers. The form of sharing can be to send an email to the mailing list, a formal white paper and/or implement the proposal. The researcher who made the proposal or other protocol developers interested in the proposal will implement the proposal in the node software. If the researcher cannot implement the proposal or the proposal is not well received by peers, the proposal will stay at this stage. To be abandoned or modified, although this may give people the impression that the contributors of Bitcoin protocol development can veto the proposal, researchers can explain their reasons to the public and bypass the existing developers. In this case, if researchers lack reputation and credibility, they will be at a disadvantage in the implementation stage. Another problem is that if Bitcoin protocol developers and the wider Bitcoin community generally think that an implementation is controversial, the maintainers of the reference implementation will not merge the implementation. The maintainer of the scheme reference implementation has a thoughtful policy, that is, to follow the changes of the consensus rather than trying to impose these changes. The reference implementation is hosted as the direct successor of the Satoshi Nakamoto code base, and it is still the most popular bitcoin node implementation because of its maturity and reliability. It is as simple as copying the bitcoin code base and publishing the proposed changes to bypass the maintainer of the reference implementation. This happens when the user activates the soft fork to modify the verification rules. Some proposals can only be implemented by hard forking. From the point of view of pre-forking nodes, soft forking is forward compatible. After adopting soft forking, nodes before forking can continue to verify the consensus rules before forking without upgrading software, but these nodes before forking do not verify the rule changes made by soft forking. From the point of view of nodes before forking, hard forking is not forward compatible. The nodes before forking will eventually appear in different networks from the nodes after forking. The influence of hard forking and soft forking on the network and users has always been controversial. Soft forking is considered to be safer than hard forking because it does not need to be explicitly chosen to join, but it may also be regarded as a threat. If someone disagrees with soft forking, it must be hard forked to overthrow it. After the implementation of node software, users must be persuaded to use node software. For example, blockchain browsers also have greater power because many users rely on their nodes. In addition, exchanges can decide which verification rule set belongs to which token, speculators, large holders and other exchange counterparties. 比特币今日价格行情网_okx交易所app_永续合约_比特币怎么买卖交易_虚拟币交易所平台

注册有任何问题请添加 微信：MVIP619 拉你进入群

文章转载注明 网址：https://netpsp.com/?id=61018