The bridge introduced by Shanouba Bitcoin Trading Network is inherently unstable economically. They rely on the repayment of the bridge operator. If the bridge operator successfully repays all the withdrawals within the pre-specified time, the bridge operator can claim the same amount of funds locked in the bridge contract. If they don't do this, the verifier can effectively destroy the funds locked in the bridge contract. The challenge for the bridge is that they must rely on pre-signed transactions because we don't have a contract. The only choice in the setting is to pay the locked witness or destroy the bridge operator to pay for any withdrawal by obtaining liquidity. The liquidity demand is in linear proportion to the bridge. If the bridge operator fails to pay all the withdrawal fees, the bridge funds will be burned, which means that the bigger the bridge, the greater the risk of the user's funds. This paper will introduce the final fate of the bridge through an example. This paper points out that if the withdrawal is not fully processed, the funds will be burned. In fact, this is incorrect. There is no clear stipulation about what will happen when handling withdrawals. Some design suggestions suggest choosing another predefined operator to try to handle withdrawals, but the new operator will face the same liquidity challenge as the first operator. Others suggest transferring funds to multi-signature to turn the bridge into a centralized hosting bridge, but the fundamental problem remains the same. The operator must raise funds to handle withdrawals, otherwise the security model will collapse. The figure shows the initial configuration and the capital of the bridge. There is a bridge operator with liquidity that hasn't deposited any cryptocurrency in the bridge or recorded it. The verifier is configured and monitors the whole system and will deposit them in the contract. The bridge is listening to the bridge contract in step. When it sees the deposit, it will send it to and to each deposit. Maybe he lost the bet in step, or Lisa sold him some artworks and quit. In step, he has completed all the transactions and is ready to return. They all created and paid the withdrawal. When this happens, they will be burned by the bridge contract, but the bridge operator can only use it to withdraw money from the payment. Let's talk about the working principle of withdrawal. Every month, the contract will have a deadline to check the withdrawal status, and then the bridge operator will have an extra month to pay for any withdrawal initiated before the deadline of the commitment period. It is important that this expenditure must come from the liquidity of the bridge operator's source. Before all withdrawals have been paid, the bridge operator cannot access the bridge contract. In the first step, any bank run realized that the total withdrawal of Sum exceeded the total liquidity of the bridge operator. She knew that if the bridge operator failed to pay Sum, the bridge funds might be burned as expenses by the verifier, so she did something economically reasonable and withdrew the funds. She hoped that she could get some returns from what the bridge operator owned instead of being stuck on the bridge. The core problem of the contract expenditure path was that the user could not get it immediately after submitting the withdrawal request. The funds locked in the bridge have only two expenditure paths to the bridge operator or burn, which means that if the bridge operator fails, the only way for participants is to hope that the verifier will burn the bridge liquidity crisis. In step, the bridge operator is facing a liquidity crisis. The deadline has just passed, and they are responsible for withdrawing the liquidity that the bridge operator needs to obtain when it has only the money at hand. At the end of the submission period, the bridge operator failed to pay the bridge operator's liquidity requirements in order to be able to repay it for some time. Any withdrawal bridge operator in the bridge needs to keep the ratio of liquidity to lock in the bridge, which means that the more successful the bridge is, the higher the capital requirement for the bridge operator is. The verifier challenges the bridge operator. In step, the verifier finds that the funds withdrawn from the contract are not paid. The verifier initiates a challenge response game with the bridge operator. Because the bridge operator does not pay all the withdrawals initiated before the deadline, they will lose the game. The challenge-response game needs a pre-set time to solve, ranging from weeks to months. It involves the original image agreed in the contract setting and the proof of payment. The verifier destroys the bridge funds. In the first step, the verifier wins the challenge-response game, which makes the tokens locked in the contract burn. The cashiers watch their funds locked in the bridge lose forever now. The bridge collapsed in our final state, and the bridge operator pays in proportion to the amount withdrawn. Paying the rest of the bridge and all of them can only get a small amount of compensation. The conclusion is that bridges are not real bridges. They are just optimistic repayment mechanisms used by bridge operators. Unlike letting bridge operators bear the capital risk, bridges actually let bridge users bear the capital risk. This toy example well illustrates the instability of bridges. The larger the scale of bridges, the more successful the operation, the more difficult it is for bridge operators to meet the liquidity demand. In some cases, the capital outflow may exceed the collateral held by bridge operators, such as in. Within a week, there have been more than 100 million dollars of capital outflows. The most rational way for everyone in the world is to withdraw funds because they will think that bridge operators can't get the necessary liquidity. Regarding the last interesting point, some bridge designs put forward the punishment for malicious bridge operators, and the verifier will become anyone who can spend it. If the bridge collapses and all the funds locked in it will be used to pay the fees, the largest mine pool will have more incentive to collude to collapse the bridge and collect fees. It is easy to imagine bitcoin with US dollars. If the bridge is built on the bridge, this will be the biggest opportunity we have ever seen on bitcoin. 比特币今日价格行情网_okx交易所app_永续合约_比特币怎么买卖交易_虚拟币交易所平台

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