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Block Space Purchaser Commitment

In the latest technical trends, a new market called derivatives market has provided rapid finality, thus promoting voluntary participation and fair competition between proponents and builders. This new measure has solved the problem of incentive consistency with Ethereum, effectively reduced the related operational risks and provided users with a more reliable trading experience. Motivational technology is used by processing outside Ethereum. Household transactions are transmitted to Ethereum in compressed form to speed up transaction processing. However, due to the inconsistency of incentives between Ethereum and Ethereum, this rapid transaction processing mechanism is easily affected. Users promise to settle the status of transactions on Ethereum after execution. However, this does not guarantee that transactions will indeed be included in Ethereum block. At present, Ethereum is not obliged to include transactions in its block. This situation stems from the inconsistency of incentives, even if including transactions is beneficial to the whole Ethereum. The ecosystem is not necessarily beneficial to a specific proposer. It is a key task to ensure that Ethereum voluntarily cooperates to complete the finality of the transaction. If there is no cooperation, the long-term security will be affected, which may lead to terminal delay and service interruption, which will directly affect the user experience and service reliability. To achieve rapid finality based on sequencing, two key commitments need to be made in advance to ensure that the transaction is included in Ethereum, and to verify the integrity of the state transition. As a pre-confirmation provider, the proposer of the company has aligned the incentives so that users can directly obtain the guarantee contained in the transaction. There are three potential ways to implement this scheme. The proposer directly promises to designate the proposer of Taifang as the pre-confirmation provider and directly issue a signature pre-confirmation to the user. This method can directly obtain the deterministic guarantee from Ethereum, but it may lead to delay and centralization problems. Through relay delivery, the third party relay helps to increase the possibility that the user's pre-confirmation is included. Overloaded, but there may be relay trust problems and uncertainties in the nature of commitment certainty, the commitment certificate uses the mechanism based on the certificate to motivate the proposer to complete the pre-confirmation, and ensures the reliability and certainty through the certificate reward mechanism. These measures are aimed at promoting the rapid finality ensured by the voluntary cooperation of Ethereum participants and providing users with a more reliable service experience. 比特币今日价格行情网_okx交易所app_永续合约_比特币怎么买卖交易_虚拟币交易所平台

Block space purchasers' commitment: This approach enables rollup to act as a precommittor, paying in advance for certain block construction rights from proposers. The advantage is that by having a block for finalization, rollup can commit deterministically to users and achieve fast preconfirmation through its ordering. The drawback is that rollup faces operational risks in determining future block prices.

Each approach has significant potential, but the third option has not been widely discussed due to the operational risks of determining Ethereum block prices. This article proposes a derivatives market aimed at mitigating the operational risks of rollup while promoting active participation by all parties.

The derivatives market is associated with the delegation preconfirmation and fast preconfirmation mentioned in the ordering.

Forward Contracts (Proposers with Rollup)

Rollup can achieve fast finality of transactions by prelocking Ethereum blocks through purchasing block construction rights from proposers on specific slots, similar to forward contracts commonly seen in financial markets. To understand the operational risks faced by rollup due to forward contracts, let's look at a simple scenario involving a 32-slot lookahead for proposers and slot auctions on the beacon chain.

Forward Contracts Overview

In this scenario, forward contracts allow rollup to lock in a slot from proposers at a predetermined price, providing assurance space on the blockchain for rollup. Here's a breakdown of the transaction process:

1. At t = 0, rollup knows the next round's proposer.
2. At t = 1, rollup participates in slot auctions and purchases forward contracts for specific slots from proposers.
3. Starting from t = 2, rollup sorts transactions of its users upon acquiring the slot, provides preconfirmation to users, and earns revenue from their blocks.
4. At t = 3, rollup requests execution of forward contracts, compressing its transactions into Ethereum blocks and submitting them to proposers.
5. At t = 4, proposers fulfill the contract by signing the received block and proposing it to the Ethereum blockchain.

Operational Risks for Rollup

The above scenario exposes rollup to several risks in operational costs:

1. Overpayment Risk: Rollup may inaccurately predict the value of Ethereum blocks when entering into forward contracts, leading to potential overpayment costs. Overpaying for space (e.g., entire block space) beyond what is needed for finalization can also result in excessive costs.
2. Revenue Instability: Rollup's primary source of revenue is selling rollup block space. If revenue cannot be accurately predicted at the time of signing forward contracts, rollup faces financial risk when costs exceed generated revenue.
3. Increased Labor Costs: Rollup now must engage in activities previously not undertaken, such as predicting the value of Ethereum blocks, competing with builders, and accurately forecasting revenue. This expanded role increases operational challenges and costs.

By understanding and managing these risks, rollup can better utilize forward contracts to achieve fast finality of its transactions and ensure the sustainability and efficiency of its operations.

Derivatives Market

To mitigate the operational risks associated with rollup, I propose a derivatives market comprising specialized participants (referred to as Builders). This market includes two types of derivatives: forward contracts between Builders and Proposers and swap contracts between Rollup and Builders. The aim of this market is not only to alleviate the operational risks faced by rollup in achieving fast finality through block space purchase, but also to promote

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在应对风险的同时，我们还通过充分利用每位参与者的专业知识来提高产品效率。

市场结构

远期合约（Builder 与 Proposer）

在 t = 1 时，Builder 通过参与插槽拍卖，与 Proposer 签订区块构建权的远期合约。此合约允许 Builder 确保与 Rollup 交易所需的区块空间，同时 Proposer 确保稳定的收入来源。

互换合约（Builder 与 Rollup）

在 t = 2 时，Builder 与 Rollup 签订互换合约，基于 Builder 必须在区块中包含 Rollup 交易的义务。此合约使双方能够对冲在区块构建过程中遇到的挑战。Rollup 利用其未来的区块构建权确保以太坊区块的最终化，而 Builder 通过为 Rollup 构建区块获得潜在利润，换取一部分以太坊区块。

合约执行

• 在 t = 3 时，Builder 使用从互换合约中获得的 Rollup 构建权构建 Rollup 区块，并在 t = 4 时生成收入。

• 在 t = 4 时，Rollup 强制执行互换合约下的义务，要求 Builder 将 Rollup 交易包含在通过远期合约锁定的以太坊区块中。在此过程中，Builder 通过将 Rollup 交易放置在区块底部并将 Builder 的交易放置在顶部来优化以太坊区块的附加收入生成。

• 在 t = 5 时，Builder 将以太坊区块交付给 Proposer，后者按照远期合约将其提议到以太坊上，实现预定时刻的交易最终化。

参与动机

Rollup 参与区块购买以实现快速最终化，同时对冲操作风险。通过互换合约，Rollup 预先确保了必要的区块空间，保证所有预确认的 Rollup 交易都能包含在以太坊区块中。这个过程允许 Rollup 避免为了确保以太坊区块空间而花费超过收入的风险，消除了不必要的价格预测和拍卖参与的劳动需求。

Builders 对冲因插槽拍卖导致的过度支付风险。通过远期合约确保以太坊中的顶级空间和通过互换合约确保 Rollup 区块空间，Builders 拥有双重收入来源，分散风险并提高财务稳定性。

Proposers 参与是为了获得与 Rollup 快速最终化相关的奖励。参与插槽拍卖的 Builders 会考虑到 Rollup 区块可能生成的收入（MEV）来调整他们的出价。这种关于 Rollup 最终化的激励对齐为 Proposers 提供了额外的收入机会。

一个自然的问题是：谁是预确认提供者？我的简短回答是“Rollup”，这个问题在“Rollup 中的构建区块”部分进一步详细阐述。

衍生品市场的额外设计

金融产品要有效变现，关键是营造一个让所有市场参与者公平竞争、积极参与的环境。为此，该产品包括三个关键的设计增强功能：

有条件掉期合约

互换合约通常将所有盈利机会分配给建造者，其限制可能会阻止汇总参与。为了鼓励 Rollup 参与，提出了有条件互换合约。

LLUP即将停止向建造者提供剩余的区块。Rollup可以自行构建剩余的区块，也可以通过区块拍卖将区块构建权分配给构建者，从而产生额外的收入。

如果汇总没有使用所有以太坊区块空间进行最终确定，则构建者仍然保留在以太坊区块上产生收入的机会。这平衡了双方的风险和回报，保留了汇总的创收潜力，同时保持了构建者的参与动机。

公平竞争的市场

Finalization是rollups继承以太坊安全性的关键过程，需要定期获取以太坊区块。这种强制购买为提议者创造了很高的定价能力，可能会导致不公平的竞争环境，从而损害市场效率和公平性。

一个有效的市场可以将汇总区块的可变价值与构建者购买以太坊区块的固定成本结合起来。这种一致性可以比作金融市场，其中掉期合约的“票面价值”为零，表明约定价值与市场价值之间没有差异。

为了降低单个建设者的定价权并允许 Rollup 以合理的价格收缩，必须促进参与互换交易的多个建设者之间的竞争。这可以通过支持在不同时段拥有区块建造权的多个建造者的参与来实现。此外，应扩大远期合约市场；应鼓励在不同时段拥有区块提议权的多个提议者（例如 32 个）参与这些合约。

这种结构有助于维持汇总支付给建筑商的合理成本，因为建筑商将在与提案者的远期合同中以更具竞争力的价格投标。提案者仍将最大化区块的收入，而汇总需要以太坊区块来最终确定，从而有助于公平的价格设定。

需要讨论预测期以匹配互换合约中的票面价值。

联合Rollup策略：所有Rollup的衍生品

交换合约是一种用以太坊区块的一部分交换汇总区块的价值的协议，其前提是有义务将汇总交易包含在以太坊区块的某个位置。构建者不太可能参与区块价值相对较低的汇总。因此，特定于应用程序的汇总可能具有较低的感知区块价值，可能会在掉期市场中被边缘化。

为了解决这个问题，我们引入了联合策略。联合汇总策略涉及将多个汇总分组为一个集体交易组以支持市场参与。例如，三个特定于应用程序的汇总（dex、nft 和 games）被分组在一起。该小组与单个构建者签订了交换合同，该构建者有权为所有三个汇总构建区块。在执行交换合约时，构建者有义务将组中汇总的所有交易包含到以太坊区块中。

通过交叉汇总套利等策略，所包含构建器的区块价值可能会高于单个区块。如果所有参与的汇总都是 zk 汇总，那么它们可以像Avail Nexus中那样通过证明聚合来降低验证成本，从而有效地确保特定于应用程序的汇总的快速最终确定功能。

这些额外的设计是否会削弱参与者的参与动机？

相反，这些设计增强了 Rollups 参与的动力，增加了构建者和提案者的收入机会，并培育了可持续的市场生态系统。

Rollup中的构建块

本节探讨了通过汇总中的交换合约获得区块构建权的构建者所使用的区块构建方法。这种设计实现了对于以用户为中心的汇总至关重要的抗审查性和快速预确认。

Rollup 中的审查阻力

Rollups 通过与在特定以太坊插槽中拥有区块构建权的构建者签订交换合约，为用户确保了快速的最终确定性。根据这些合约，与 PBS 类似，构建者将最有利可图的区块交付给 rollup，然后由 rollup 执行。然而，这种结构可能会使汇总用户面临审查、夹心和构建者的抢先交易攻击。

Rollup 采用 Radius 的排序引擎，为用户提供基于密码学的预先确认，确保交易不被审查。该方法涉及用户使用延迟加密对

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加密交易汇总，保障用户安全

最新的区块链交易技术采用了高度加密的方法，将交易过程置于保密之中，并将其提交至加密内存池的汇总中。这种加密技术使得交易内容能够保持机密，直至确认将其包含在汇总区块中，从而有效地防止了任何意图对交易进行审查的行为。一旦确认将交易纳入汇总区块，交易即会自动解密，使得汇总系统能够执行其中的交易并提供预先确认。汇总区块中的承诺确保了交易顺序的不可篡改性，有效地保护了用户免受抢先交易和三明治攻击等风险。

快速预先确认

Rollup技术通过指定预先配置的提供者作为排序器，将区块空间分割为顶部区块（ToB）和底部区块（BoB），实现了快速预先确认的功能。

ToB是汇总区块中最具价值的空间，该空间的建设权被分配给了通过互换协议签署合同的建设者。建设者根据前一区块状态生成后续运行包，并将其交付以执行和获取利润。

BoB则被用于存放汇总内的普通用户交易，它将这些交易进行排序，提供了预先确认的功能。

这一结构充分展示了Radius排序引擎的协同作用，保护用户免受建设者故意有害的最大效益竞价（MEV）影响，因为所有用户交易在BoB中都是加密的。即使单个测序器对BoB进行测序，也能有效保护用户免受审查、三明治攻击和抢先交易等中心化风险的影响，同时实现了快速预先确认的功能。

联合Rollup策略

上文介绍的联合Rollup策略是一种保持其自定义可扩展性并有效实现快速最终确定性的方法。下文将演示建设者如何构建选择此策略的Rollup区块。

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Radius 公布最新 Rollup 策略

近日，Radius 发布了最新的 Rollup 策略。根据 Syndicated Rollup 策略，Rollup A 和 B 作为一个整体与建筑商签订合同，将 ToB（Top-of-Block）建筑权分配给建筑商。构建者创建要包含在 ToB 中的交叉汇总捆绑包，并将它们提交到每个汇总。汇总会验证提交的构建者是否是根据授权协议签订合同的各方，并将捆绑包包含在 ToB 中。在此过程中，汇总可以利用共享排序引擎来促进合同的顺利执行。

在BoB排序中，rollups可以在独立排序引擎和共享排序引擎之间进行选择。如果汇总希望为用户提供汇总之间的可组合性，他们会选择共享排序引擎，其中选定的排序器充当共享预配置提供程序。如果每个rollup选择自己的排序引擎，它们可以独立地为用户提供快速的预确认。

结论

一位 Radius 发言人表示，他对以 Rollup 为中心的以太坊的未来充满热情，并且特别致力于以更加以用户为中心的方向推进 Rollup。快速终结性是让用户在rollups上享受真实交易速度的能力，而以太坊自愿参与衍生品市场可以有效地实现快速终结性。Radius 的排序引擎确保参与衍生品市场的 Rollups 确保自身的审查抵抗力和快速预先确认，即使是在与构建商的合同中。

下一步是什么？

1. 探索衍生品市场所需的技术要求。这包括用于结算合同的信息交换所、监控跟踪和管理合同履行情况以及执行承诺的削减机制。

2. 探索利用 Blobspace 的汇总设计。使用 blobspace 的 Rollup 必须购买整个 blob，无论所需的空间如何，这应该与我提出的市场结构无缝集成。Tamara 最近提出的 blobspace 导数也很有趣。

3. 提出有助于以太坊去中心化的其他设计。这个市场可以通过与汇总最终性相一致的激励措施来鼓励提议者自愿参与，但这可能会由于提议者的汇集因素而导致以太坊的中心化。正如mikeneuder ( Execution Ticket ) 和barnabe ( APS-Burn )建议的那样，将信标提议者和执行提议者分开的设计可能是一个潜在的解决方案。

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