The author's independent researcher source translation Shanouba Bitcoin Trading Network seems to be preparing to vote on the allocation of agreement fees to the pledgee in the next few months. This paper shares my personal views and guesses about the future impact of this vote. The abstract of pledge proposal is currently being discussed in the governance forum. A proposal aimed at transforming it into a cost-sharing token is proposed. The main idea is to upgrade the agreement governance and realize the agreement fee collection without permission, and charge the token holders who have pledged and entrusted to vote in proportion. Allocating any agreement fee allows governance to continue to control the core parameters, which mines charge fees and the size of fees. This initial proposal is the basis of another future proposal, which will actually introduce agreement fees to some pools. Assuming that the voting on the chain is successful, the community will be able to choose to charge fees as a representative. I generally agree with the proposal of allocating fees from the pools to the pledgees. I think this will be an interesting experiment. The full preparation behind this proposal clearly shows the ability and ability of the foundation. At present, there are still uncertainties, for example, the specific pool where the fees will be implemented and the exact agreement rate fee switch must be customized for each pool, which means that it is meaningless to charge fees for mines with small capacity or short life only for the activation fee of the selected pool group economically, especially when considering the governance work required for each fee conversion decision, the selected mine pool is likely to be basically the same as the mine pool that has already charged the front-end fee. According to the previous voting, it is expected that the agreement rate will be set at the total mutual. At present, there is no public plan to implement fees on or before the exchange of fees. These versions can be solved in the future discussion. The experiment of fee conversion will be an important reference point. The future is the most dominant iteration of the platform at present, and in some ways it is also the largest at present. However, I think it is already declining for the following reasons, which means that trying to switch fees on the internet is a relatively low-risk behavior, and the development strategy that will be largely replaced is the same as Intel's previous model. Some similarities are that the architecture progress is followed by optimization. In this case, it represents a ticking cycle and the composition of the upcoming cycle. Compared with the technical level at that time, another cycle is a major progress. It is similar in architecture, but it has new functions such as interchange and price prediction machine, and other enhancements have been made to the overall design. Although the competition is still strong, it highlights its lasting appeal and introduces another architecture leap and liquidity concentration. However, it does have some major shortcomings, not only in use, but also in use. Complexity increases the market risk of limited partners, and it is more susceptible to arbitrage leakage, especially in the lower cost level pool of volatile assets. The design I predict will not last in the long run, and the tried and trusted model may last longer than it. Once it is launched, it is expected to surpass it soon, thanks to the following improvements and optimizations, including the singleton design that reduces transmission costs and the transient storage mechanism that significantly reduces costs, which is beneficial to limited partnerships. People's innovation aims at regaining the arbitrage loss value through auction and dynamic fees, providing more favorable environmental support for limited partners. The function will re-integrate all-round liquidity positions to accommodate transfer fees tokens and allow donations and other enhancement functions in the liquidity pool. Essentially, it aims to solve the shortcomings while integrating the advantages of its predecessor, intensifying competition and increasing competitors. At first, it used its innovative centralized liquidity model and restrictive licensing to dominate the industry. These special advantages no longer exist, and the core code has been emerging in the next year. It is true that high-quality competition continues to emerge, and it still has the most lindy, tested and solid code base, while some competitors have been caught in hacking attacks. However, these benefits will inevitably weaken with the passage of time, and the developing trading mechanism is developing towards an intention-based system. Therefore, we expect that the proportion of transactions through the chain will decline, although it is now announced. It's still too early for the cloth model to be outdated, but the rise of Isoplatform may continue and increase its market share. The emerging thought-centered chain and the debate about whether the dedicated application chain is the future have convincing arguments. As emphasized, in the current model, the exchange fees paid by the exchanges are higher than the exchange fees paid by the limited partners, which is shocking and inefficient. In addition, the losses caused by the imperfect execution caused by the slip point are also greater than those caused by the traders. Swap fees are at least like this in 2006, and the user experience of trading is improving significantly every year. However, if the focus of Ethereum is still on the settlement layer, these problems are unlikely to be completely solved in the future. People can constantly optimize the design and make it complicated, but it is impossible to completely copy the trading experience on the chain with a second block time, at least without sacrificing decentralization or censorship resistance. No one wants to connect their assets across the chain to slightly improve him. In addition, we really don't need further liquidity fragmentation. However, the potential of sharing sorting on the main network of Ethereum may change the rules of the game. This innovation will realize the synchronization and composability between the two, thus allowing the contracts on the network to seamlessly access all the participating liquidity. Such development will eliminate most of the concerns about liquidity dispersion and user inconvenience. All in all, these factors make it unlikely to continue to occupy the dominant position of the main network. It will not cause too much if you carefully try to convert the fees. The problem of big loss of limited partners does not represent the risk of tax fee conversion. If the fee conversion leads to the withdrawal of many liquidity providers, it may be counterproductive. Losing limited partners will mean that the liquidity of the fund pool will be reduced, thus reducing the attractiveness of the fund pool to traders. The reduction of exchange activities will reduce the income of the remaining limited partners and lead to the departure of more limited partners, which may trigger a chain reaction, and the liquidity will continue to decline, leading to the worst-case death spiral. Fortunately, the goal is achieved. Up to now, traders don't seem to be too sensitive to price changes. Even if some limited partners decide to leave the overall trading volume after charging, it may not drop sharply, which means that the remaining limited partners will eventually get a higher annual interest rate. Before considering the agreement fees, these higher trading gains will offset the cost of the agreement fees to some extent, thus achieving a stable balance. Some research supporting this view is currently being updated, indicating that as long as the fees are not too high, the death spiral is unlikely to occur. Their data-driven method is reassuring. If the fees are charged carefully, it will not lead to limited partners. 比特币今日价格行情网_okx交易所app_永续合约_比特币怎么买卖交易_虚拟币交易所平台

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