为解决Solana拥堵问题的SWQoS是什么？是否会带来更严重的中心化问题

The author Chen Mo, the founder of the source of the congestion problem, currently gives almost two kinds of solutions that allow improvement to improve the priority, which are divided into global impact and local impact under different circumstances. This is controversial. The full name is that this is a service quality mechanism that gives priority to transactions through equity weighting. Simply put, it is based on the consensus mechanism that verifiers with more equity pledges can get more priority trading services. When bandwidth calculation and storage are limited, nodes with higher equity will get priority. In this way, access rights effectively prevent malicious generation of a large number of transactions to interfere with the network, but it is not difficult to see that it is particularly beneficial to commercial infrastructure operators and exchanges, because they can establish cooperative relations with verifiers with greater rights and interests to ensure that their transactions are given priority, which is followed by centralization. Entities that have gathered a large number of pledged rights may monopolize priority access rights, which seems to be more direct than the centralization problem. In the short term, performance problems should be solved first. It is correct, but in the long run, I personally think that some incentives and restrictions should be introduced, such as limiting the maximum proportion of rights and interests that a single verifier can have. In addition, I will explain why the problem of concentration of rights and interests will have a greater impact than the problem of centralization, because the pledge of rights and interests is not directly related to the transaction priority in Ethereum, but whether the concentration of rights and interests will affect the transaction answer at other levels will still be possible, but it is more difficult to complete. The concept of a block proposer, a verifier with more rights and interests is more likely to be selected as a block proposer, but the chance for each verifier to propose a block is randomly distributed. The verifier with more rights and interests will naturally have a higher chance to propose a block, and the block proposer has the right to decide the contents of the block including which transactions. Therefore, if a pledge service or group controls a large number of pledge rights and interests, they may also affect the priority of transactions to some extent, but it is undoubtedly at the expense of this line of defense. The relationship between easy priority and pledge rights may have an immediate effect on performance improvement in the short term, but in the long run, if other incentive or supervision mechanisms are not introduced, the problem of centralization will become more and more serious. 比特币今日价格行情网_okx交易所app_永续合约_比特币怎么买卖交易_虚拟币交易所平台

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