以太坊验证者数量超100万 “彩虹质押”如何缓解质押中心化问题？
“反相关激励”提案
虽然Vitalik Buterin认可大型验证者给以太坊网络提供的优势，但他仍试图在大型验证者与去中心化和弹性网络的要求之间取得平衡。3月27日，他提出了“反相关激励”的创新计划，旨在应对在验证者中心化的问题，加大对大型验证者出现故障的惩罚，增强以太坊质押机制的去中心化和公平性。
以太坊网络的相关性故障可能由于从单个位置对多个验证器的控制，从而破坏了系统的去中心化性质。为了解决这一问题，“反相关激励”计划将惩罚验证者的相关故障，从而激励他们扩大其验证器的活动范围。
Vitalik Buterin认为，如果由同一实体控制的多个验证者一起出故障，他们将受到比单独验证者故障更高的罚款，因为大型验证者犯的任何错误都将在其控制的所有身份中复制。例如，同一集群中的验证器（如Staking Pool）更有可能经历相关的故障，可能是由于共享基础架构所致。
该提案建议对偏离平均故障率的验证者进行惩罚相应的惩罚。如果许多验证者在给定的插槽中出故障，则每个故障的罚款将更高。
模拟表明，该方法可以降低大型以太坊质押平台的优势，因为大型实体更有可能导致由于相关故障而导致故障率的飙升。该提案的潜在好处包括通过为每个验证者建立单独的基础架构并使solo staking相对于质押池更具经济竞争力来激励去中心化。
除此之外，Vitalik Buterin还提出了其他选择，例如不同的惩罚方案，以最大程度地降低大型验证者的优势，并检查对地理和客户去中心化的影响。
尽管以太坊拥有诸如罚没（slashing）的惩罚机制来应对严重违规行为，但这些机制通常用来处理极其恶意或严重的行为。该提议将惩罚纳入常规网络运营中，强调促进验证者之间的真实多元化。该策略的目的是确保努力提高去中心化，促进产生实质性的转变，而不是仅仅表面上的遵守。
Although the proposal of anti-correlation incentive recognizes the advantages provided by large verifiers to Taifang network, he still tries to strike a balance between the requirements of large verifiers and decentralized and elastic networks. On April, he proposed an innovative plan of anti-correlation incentive to deal with the problem of centralizing verifiers, increase the punishment for the failure of large verifiers, and enhance the decentralization and fairness of Ethereum pledge mechanism. The failure of Ethereum network may be due to the control of multiple verifiers from a single location. In order to solve this problem, the anti-correlation incentive plan will punish the related failures of the verifiers, thus encouraging them to expand the scope of their verifier activities. It is believed that if multiple verifiers controlled by the same entity fail together, they will be fined higher than those of individual verifiers, because any mistakes made by large verifiers will be replicated in all identities controlled by them. For example, verifiers in the same cluster may be more likely to experience related failures. Enjoy the infrastructure. The proposal proposes to punish the verifiers who deviate from the average failure rate and punish them accordingly. If many verifiers fail in a given slot, the fine for each failure will be higher. Simulation shows that this method can reduce the advantages of large-scale Ethereum pledge platform, because large entities are more likely to cause the failure rate to soar due to related failures. The potential benefits of this proposal include establishing a separate infrastructure for each verifier and making it more economically competitive relative to the pledge pool. Besides, other options, such as different punishment schemes, are proposed to minimize the advantages of large verifiers and check the impact on geography and customer decentralization. Although Ethereum has punishment mechanisms such as fines to deal with serious violations, these mechanisms are usually used to deal with extremely malicious or serious behaviors. This proposal puts punishment into regular network operations and emphasizes the promotion of real diversification among verifiers. The purpose of this strategy is to ensure that efforts are made to improve decentralization and promote substantive changes rather than just superficial compliance. 比特币今日价格行情网_okx交易所app_永续合约_比特币怎么买卖交易_虚拟币交易所平台
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